Attacks on double block length hash functions using a block cipher are considered in this paper. We present a general free-start attack, in which the attacker is free to choose the initial value, and a real attack on a large class of hash functions. Recent results on the complexities of attacks on double block hash functions are summarized.
Introduction
A hash function is an easily implementable mapping from the set of all binary sequences of some speci ed minimum length or greater to the set of binary sequences of some xed length. In cryptographic applications, hash functions are used within digital signature schemes and within schemes to provide data integrity (e.g., to detect modi cation of a message). An iterated hash function is a hash function Hash( ) determined by an easily computable function h( ; ) from two binary sequences of respective lengths m and l to a binary sequence of length m in the manner that the message M = (M 1 ; M 2 ; :::; M n ), where M i is of length l, is hashed to the hash value H = H n of length m by computing recursively H i = h(H i?1 ; M i ) i = 1; 2; : : : ; n; (1) where H 0 is a speci ed initial value. We will write H = Hash(H 0 ; M) to show explicitly the dependence on H 0 . The function h will be called the hash round function. For message data whose total length in bits is not a multiple of l, one can apply deterministic \padding " 5, 10 ] to the message to be hashed by (1) to increase the total length to a multiple of l.
For iterated hash functions, we distinguish the following ve attacks:
1. Remark. Target attacks are also called \preimag" attacks and free-start attacks are also referred as \pseudo" attacks 14]. In applications where H 0 is speci ed and xed, attacks 2, 4 and 5 are not \real attacks". This is because the initial value H 0 is then an integral part of the hash function so that a hash value computed from a di erent initial value will not be accepted. However, if the sender is free to choose and/or to change H 0 , attacks 2, 4 and 5 can be real attacks, depending on the manner in which the hash function is used. Note that the free-start and semi-free-start attacks are never harder than the attacks where H 0 is speci ed in advance.
For an m-bit hash function, brute-force target attacks, in which one randomly chooses an M 0 until one hits the \target" H = Hash(H 0 ; M); require about 2 m computations of hash values. It follows from the usual \birthday argument" that brute-force collision attacks require about 2 m=2 computations of hash values. In particular, for hash round functions with l m so that all 2 m hash values can be reached with one-block messages, brute-force target attacks require about 2 m computations of the round function h while brute-force collision attacks require about 2 m=2 computations of the round function h. We will say that the computational security of the hash function is ideal when there is no attack substantially better than brute force.
We will consider iterated hash functions based on (m; k) block ciphers, where an (m; k) block cipher de nes, for each k-bit key, a reversible mapping from the set of all m-bit plaintexts onto the set of all m-bit ciphertexts. We write E Z (X) to denote the encryption of the m-bit plaintext X under the k-bit key Z, and D Z (Y ) to denote the decryption of the m-bit ciphertext Y under the k-bit key Z. We de ne the hash rate of such an iterated hash function (or equivalently, of an round function) as the number of m-bit message blocks processed per encryption or decryption. The complexity of an attack is the total number of encryptions or decryptions required for the attack. In our discussion we will always assume that the (m; k) block cipher has no known weaknesses, so the results can be applied to any block cipher. For the security of hash functions based on speci c ciphers, see 1, 14] .
Because an attack on the m-bit round function implies an attack of the same type on the corresponding m-bit iterated hash function with roughly the same complexity, the design of computationally secure round functions is a necessary (but not su cient) condition for the design of computationally secure iterated hash functions. Moreover, under certain conditions (cf. 3, 6, 10, 13]), a computationally secure round function implies a computationally secure iterated hash function. To avoid some trivial attacks 8], the Merkle-Damgaard Strengthening (MD-strengthening) will always be assumed, in which the last block of the message to be hashed represents the binary length of the true message.
2 Double block length hash functions using block ciphers A well-known example of an iterated hash function is the Davies-Meyer scheme (DM), where the hash round function is given by
Here E K (P) is the encrypted value of plaintext P using key K with block cipher E.
The DM-scheme with MD-strengthening is generally considered to be secure if the underlying block cipher with block size m has no weaknesses. Thus, we will assume that, for the single block DM-scheme, the complexity of a free-start collision attack is about 2 m=2 and the complexity of a free-start target attack is about 2 m . Since most block ciphers have a block length of only 64 bits, the hash code of the DM-scheme is only 64 bits. A collision attack needs at most about 2 32 encryptions, which can be done reasonably fast using today's technology. Therefore, much research has been done to construct hash functions with a block length of 2m bits based on the concatenation of two variants of the DM-scheme. One such scheme, the MDC-2 9, 11] will be published as an ISO standard 5]. A systematic method proposed in 4] to analyze such hash functions is to consider the following general form of double length round functions.
General form of the 2m-bit round function with rate 1: Next we consider the free-start collision attack, i.e., we will nd two di erent values of (H 1 i?1 ; H 2 i?1 ; M i ) yielding the same value for (H 1 i ; H 2 i ) according to (3) . This attack is similar to the free-start target attack just described, except that here, one only generates 2 m=2 values of (H will be the same with high probability.
2
Theorem 1 showed that for the class of hash-functions of the form (3) the complexities of free-start target and free-start collision attacks are upper bounded by 2 m and 2 m=2 , respectively. Hash functions achieving these upper bounds for the free-start attacks are said to be optimum against a free-start attack 4]. The Parallel-DM scheme was shown in 4] to be optimum. The idea is that given a speci c initial value of the hash function one hopes that the complexity of usual collision and target attacks are higher than the proven lower bounds for free-start attacks. However, using the solvingone-half attack, the complexity of usual collision and target attacks are shown to be the same as the complexities for free-start attacks.
The Parallel-DM scheme. This scheme is a 2m-bit hash function based on an m-bit block cipher with an m-bit key and is de ned as follows H (9) . Theorem 2 then implies that the complexity of target attack is about 4 2 m and the complexity of collision attack is about 4 2 m=2 : Note that the similar attacks have been reported before in 6, 14], but the above attack has a simpler form.
The result of Theorem 2 is for the \parallel" form of the round function in which the two encryptions work side-by-side. Similar attack can also be applied to the \serial" form in which one encryption is computed after the other. these schemes can be considered as slight modi cations of the 64-bit DM-scheme hash round function. The complexities of known attacks on these hash functions are listed in Table 1 . We assume that all the iterated hash functions are used with MD-strengthening and that the underlying block cipher has no known weakness (such as weak keys).
